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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KAY J. LARSEN, 
Plaintiff & Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 18198 
JUDY LARSEN (THOMAS), 
Defendant & Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT KAY J. LARSEN 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a review of judgement entered by the Third 
District Court in and for the County of Salt Lake, Honorable 
Ernest F. Baldwin presiding, pursuant to Appellant's Order to 
Show Cause in re Contempt and child support arrearage. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The District Court entered judgement for Plaintiff 
& Respondent for $3,600.00 child support arrearage, attorney's 
fees of $175.00 and costs of $17~50. A three day jail sentence 
was stayed as long as Plaintiff /Respondent made regular payments 
as due and $50.00 per month on the arrearage. Later, after 
hearing pet!tion to modify the decree, the court awarded an in-
crease of $25.00 per month per child to be paid until each of 
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two children graduated from High School or if they did not 
graduate, then until age 18. The modification is not an issue. 
RELIEF SOUGHT BY RESPONDENT 
Respondent seeks dismissal of Appellant's appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Respondent agrees with the facts as stated by Respond-
ent except where the Appellant states that "Plaintiff /Respondent 
stipulated that he had rtot allocated any of the payments to any 
particular portion of the arrearage." The Plaintiff/Respondent 
did not appear in court and his counsel made no such stipulation; 
any representation to that effect is a completely unsupported 
fabrication and constitutes an unethical attempt to create support 
for issues that were not raised at hearing on the Appellant's 
Order to Show Cause. 
The Appellant's references to her memorandum and "full 
accounting" are not agreed with: the "full accounting" is merely 
a tabular re-cap of the payments mad~ as reflected by the Alimony 
Clerk's record of payments received from the Respondent since the 
divorce of the parties. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPELLANT'S NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS NOT TIMELY FILED AND NO BOND 
FOR COSTS ON APPEAL HAS BEEN FILED; THEREFORE, THIS COURT HAS NO 
JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE APPEAL AND APPELLANT HAS NOT PERFECTED 
HER APPEAL. THE APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED. 
An appeal must be taken within one month of the final 
-2-
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order appealed from or the Supreme Court can have no jurisdiction 
to hear the matter. Rule 73(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Anderson v. Anderson, 3 U. (2d) 277, 282 P.2d 845. Ratliff, 
Estate of v. Conrad, 19 U.(2d) 346, 431 P. 2d 571. Anderson v. 
Halthusen Mercantile Co., 30 U. 31, 83 P. 560. 
Hearing was had on Appellant's Order to Show Cause 
July 9, 1981 (R.p.71). Parties counsel stipulated that the pay-
ments made to Appellant by Respondent were correctly reflected 
on photo copies of the Alimony Clerk's records. (R.p. 85-87). 
Appellant, on July 15, 1981 submitted a "Motion for Rehearing, 
(R.p.79) and submitted therewith a memorandum. (R.p.74-78). Ap-
pellant's motion was heard August 19, 1981, Respondent was granted 
seven days to file a responsive memorandum. (R.p.89-92). There-
after, Appellant's petition to modify decree of divorce (R.p.66) 
was heard on October 7, 1981 (R.p.88). At this hearing the court 
was asked for its ruling on the support arrearage and contempt 
matter, at which time the court stated it wouid stand by the 
ruling it made on July 9, 1981, counsel for appellant was directed 
to prepare the Order. On October 12, 1981, Appellant's counsel 
sent a copy of a proposed judgement, with an attached letter, to 
Respondent's counsel, stating if no objection was voiced within 
7 days, the order would then be submitted to the judge for sign-
iture. (See Exhibit "A", Affadavit of Respondent's counsel and 
attachments). Two days thereafter, on October 14, 1981, Respondent's 
counsel sent a letter to counsel for Appellant setting forth ob-
jections to the language of the order. (Attachment 2). No re-
sponse to that letter was received, so on November 6, 1981, another 
-3-
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letter, (attachment No. 3 to Exhibit "A"), was sent to Appellant's 
counsel along with a copy of a proposed judgement. The letter 
stated that if there was no objection thereto made within seven 
day~ the judgement would be submitted to the judge for sign~ture. 
No objection was raised and on November 17, 1981, the judgement 
was submitted to Judge Baldwin for signature and it was entered 
by the court on November 18, 1981. (R.p.93-94). There was no 
appeal taken from this judgement within one month from its entry. 
Appellant filed her notice of appeal January 4, 1982. 
The record is confusing because the judgement submitted 
to Respondent's counsel for approval, and not approved, now ap-
pears in the record, (R.p.95-96),showing it to have been signed 
on October 12, 1981 (the same day it was supposedly mailed to 
Respondent's counsel) and entered by the Clerk of the Court on 
December 1, 1981. 
Respondent therefore submits that the judgement dated 
October 12, 1981 was erroneously or improperly submitted and 
signed and should be of no effect; prejudgement interest was not 
asked for, no~ was it awarded by the trial court; the method of 
calculation is unknown, the interest rate used is wrong, and there-
fore the amount improper. These were the reasons Respondent ob-
jected to this judgement as originally prepared. 
Therefore, the Appellant's Notice of Appeal was not timely 
filed, being filed more than one month after the 18th day of Nov-
ember 1981. (The existance of a judgement signed October 12, 1981 
was not discovered by Respondent until the day before hearing of 
-4-
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-Respondent's motion to dismiss Appellant's appeal.) 
The Appellant's appeal should likewise be dismissed 
for failure of Appellant to perfect her appeal by filing of a 
bond for costs on appeal, the requirement for which was never 
waived. 
POINT II 
THE ISSUE OF ALLOCATION OF PAYMENTS WAS NOT RAISED PRIOR TO 
HEARING ON APPELLANT'S ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND THERE IS NO 
EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD THEREON. 
The Appellant's two Orders to Show Cause (R.p. 65 & 
66) do not allege any allocation of payments and are in fact 
not supported by either affadavit or verified petition appearing 
in the record. Therefore, the issue of allocation of payments 
was not raised, nor were the Appellant's pleadings ever amended 
to include such issue, nor did the trial court hear evidence 
thereon. The only evidence before the lower court were the photo 
copies of the Third District Court's Alimony Clerk's records of 
payments (R.p. 85-87), which only show the date and amount re-
ceived by the clerk and the date and amount forwarded to Appellant. 
The matter of allocation of a payment is a matter of intent 
of the pay~r or if not in any way determinable, of the payee. 
(See 60 Am Jur 2d §80 et seq.). However, there is, as earlier 
mentioned, no evidence at all before the court on the issue. The 
issue was not raised by Appellant before the trial court. However, 
it is obvious that if a non-custodial parent, owing a support 
obligation, has financial demands that exceed his income period-
ically and he is unable to pay all of his financial obligations and 
therefore fails to make one or more of these support payments; the 
next payment he in fact makes is intended by him to pay the sup-
-5-
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port obligation due the month of his payment. Where an obliger 
has the right to allocate and if he knows of that right, he 
certainly will allocate the payment in a manner that will best 
serve the interests of himself and his immediate family. 
The dicta cited in Seely:-,. v. Park, 532 P.2d 684 at 685 
(Utah 1975) is not supported by reference to any evidence there 
before the court. The court said" ... the presumption is that a 
payment made without specific allocation is to be applied against 
the oldest part of the debt." Whether specific allocation had 
been made or not is a question of fact and the court in Seeley 
says nothing of how or where that fact was decided. It appears 
there, as in the instant case, that it had not been decided. 
In questions of allocation, consideration - would also 
be given to the rights and interests of third parties. As 
stated in 60 Arn Jur 2d §91: 
... If the debtor fails to direct the 
application of his payment, and the 
creditor does not exercise his right 
of application, the law will apply the 
payment to the oldest debt, unless 
justice and equity demand a different 
appropriation, or unless the rights and 
e uities of third persons are involved. 
Emphasis added 
Here, the Respondent has two young children and a wife 
who is a full time mother and homemaker, (R.p.83) and therefore 
justice, equity and the third parties interests would not be served 
by saddling their provider with a judgement three times that a-
warded by the trial court. 
The courts in certain cases cited by Appellant, Seely 
(supra.), Chudzinski vs. Chudzinski, 26 Ariz App 130, 546 P.2d 1139 
-6-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(1976); Young v. Williams, 583 P.2d 205 (Alaska 1978) and 
others, are unfairly equating support cases to commercial and 
contract cases, by applying the theory of allocation to them. 
The courts go beyond that, and without making factual inquiry 
about the obligors intent as to allocation, indulge in a fictional 
assumption. The courts apply the allocation theory, one of the 
foundations of which is that the obligor has· the right to allo-
cate, in cases where there is no evidence at all about the obligors 
actual allocation or intent to allocate. In doing so, they fail 
to make inquiry about the obligor's allocation, but presume there 
was none. 
It is unjust to allow application of "allocation" doc-
trine to situations in which the obligor is totally unaware of 
what his rights are under such doctrine. Such blanket application 
of the doctrine results in great unfairness. For a "worst cas-e" 
example, assume that a divorced non-custodial parent under a sup-
port obligation experienced severe financial problems, paid nothing 
for the first eight years after his divorce, then after rehabili-
tating himself for the next eight years was able to pay each 
current payment as it became due. Under the allocation doctrine 
as Appellant would have it applied, the parent could have judgement 
taken against him for the full eight years of support payments if 
he had not allocated his payments to current support obligations. 
Respondent acknowledges children's need for support, 
but the courts create great mischief when they attempt to insulate 
some parties over others from certain realities of life: such 
-7-
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as those times when there is legitimately not enough money to 
cover basic expenses. The courts should make inquiry in these 
situations and not unjustly penalize a non-custodial parent for 
matters beyond his control. 
POINT III 
THE APPELLANT IS NOT LAWFULLY ENTITLED TO THE FUNDS SHE SEEKS 
BY REASON OF HAVING ASSIGNED THEM TO THE STATE AND HAS THERE-
FORE PERPETRATED A FRAUD ON THE COURT FOR NOT SO DIVULGING. 
HER APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED AND REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT 
FOR DETERMINATION OF ANY PROPER AMOUNT SHE MAY BE DUE. 
Respondent learned after the Appellant had filed her 
notice of appeal. that she had signed an assignment of support 
obligation to the State of Utah (R.p.111) and that she had 
received certain public assistance payments from the ·state. 
(as partially set forth on R.p. 110) 
Respondent became aware of the foregoing when the State 
of Utah served him with the proceedings via the Clark County, 
Nevada Court, which pleadings are in the record, page 101-119. 
From the URESA pleadings, it is evident that Appellant 
is not entitled to recover any sums due her for the months she 
received public assistance. Those amounts would be properly due 
the State of Utah. In fact, Appellant, having received both sup-
port payments from Respondent and public assistance from the State 
of Utah for the same month, would be guilty of fraud. 
Therefore, the matter should be remanded to the trial 
court in order that the judgement may be properly adjusted. Note 
also that according to DeAnna Earl, investigator for the Office of 
Recovery Services, the amounts shown as paid to Appellant are not 
complete. Appellant received public assistance as early as 1967. 
-8-
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(Exhibit "B", letter from DeAnna Earl to Jo Kost dated April 
14, 1982) 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant's appeal, not being timely taken should 
be dismissed. The judgement signed October 12, 1981 was erron-
eously or improperly submitted to the court, Appellant's counsel 
had purportedly given Respondent's counsel seven days to comment 
or object to the proposed language of the judgement yet the 
trial court signed said judgement the day it was shown as being 
mailed to Respondent's counsel. This court should then set this 
judgement aside. The judgement signed November 17, 1981 was 
submitted to and signed by the court after Appellant failed to 
respond to Respondent's objections and comments and after notice 
of preparation of the corrected judgement, and after having had 
ample time to comment thereon before it was submitted to the 
Court. In any event, the notice of appeal was not filed within 
one month of the signing of the judgement of October 12, 1981 nor 
the docketing of the judgement signed November 17, 1981. Why the 
earlier judgement was not filed until December 1, 1981 is an un-
explained fluke and should not serve to improperly extend the time 
for appeal. 
For the reasons heretofore stated, the doctrine of al-
location should not be applied where the issue was never raised in 
the pleadings at the Order to Show Cause hearing and where there 
was no evidence taken thereon. 
-9-
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Since it is clear that Appellant is not entitled to 
the full amount of the judgement heretofore entered and h~s 
attempted to perpetrate a fraud on the court for failure to 
divulge her assignment of support, her appeal should be dis-
missed and remanded to the trial court for such further pro-
ceedings as are appropriate. In fact, the provisions of § 
55-15c-5(3) Utah Code Annotated, as amended 1953, so requires. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ..!?/___ day of June, 1982. 
J],~~~~ D. KENDALLERKINS 
Attorney for Plaintiff /Respondent 
525 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-2552 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Responden1 
Brief, postage prepaid, to Phippil A. Harding, attorney for 
Appellant, 175 ~~th West Temple, Suite 500, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84101 this .&_!fday of June, 1982. 
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